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THE THIRD PRECEDENT 
Kevin Bennardo* 
INTRODUCTION 
The traditional approach to legal authorities divides the world into two 
types of precedent: binding (mandatory) and non-binding (persuasive). This 
binary division is attractive because its simplicity gives the impression that 
it is comprehensive. But it is not comprehensive. Rather, it is overly 
simplistic. It neglects nuances in the precedential value of certain judicial 
opinions. This Article identifies one such area that does not fit well into either 
of the traditional categories of precedent. 
In state statutory law, uniform acts are widespread, both in terms of 
breadth of subject matter and in terms of legislative adoptions.1 Many of these 
acts contain a mandatory uniformity provision that requires courts to apply 
and construe the statute “to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform 
the law with respect to the subject of this Act among states enacting it.”2 By 
enacting this language, a state’s legislature commands its judiciary to 
interpret the statute in accordance with how it has been interpreted in other 
states. This directive presents a precedential puzzle: does the case law of 
other enacting states qualify as binding precedent, non-binding precedent, or 
something else? 
This Article concludes that prior out-of-state case law from a state’s 
highest court should take on a new character in this situation. It should neither 
be binding nor non-binding on the judiciaries of other enacting states. Rather, 
it should be recognized as a new precedential category: “interstitial 
authority.”3 This Article proposes a two-step test for courts to follow when 
weighing interstitial authority to interpret a uniform act that contains a 
mandatory uniformity provision.4 First, the court should determine whether 
  
 * Kevin Bennardo is a Clinical Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina 
School of Law and a Non-Resident Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Palau. 
Research for this Article was supported by an ALWD/LWI/Lexis Scholarship Grant. The author 
appreciates the input he received upon presenting the idea at a New Scholars Showcase at the 2017 
Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting and at the 2015 Central States Legal Writing 
Conference. Particular thanks for feedback by Alexa Chew, Mark Glover, Ellie Margolis, and Craig 
Smith. 
1 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 2 E.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (ULC 1985). 
 3 As explained in more detail below, the concept of interstitial authority is meant to fill the small 
gap between binding and non-binding precedent. See infra Part IV. 
 4 This proposed two-step test repurposes the Chevron deference test from administrative law, 
which guides courts in determining how much weight to give to prior statutory interpretations by 
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the statutory language is clear. If it is clear, then the court should apply the 
statute’s clear meaning. If the statute is ambiguous, then the court should 
adopt the same interpretation as the out-of-state court as long as the out-of-
state court’s interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. This 
approach comports with the statutory requirement that the law be interpreted 
to further the purpose of uniformity among the enacting states, but it provides 
enough leeway to ensure that a manifestly incorrect interpretation will not be 
automatically perpetuated around the country. Plugging this precedential gap 
would resolve the inconsistency that currently occupies this area of the law.5 
In Part I, this Article provides some necessary background on the 
traditional binary labels of binding and non-binding precedent, reviews the 
Uniform Law Commission (“Commission”) and its drafting process, and 
provides an introduction to uniformity provisions. Part II describes the lack 
of a consistent judicial response to mandatory uniformity provisions and 
examines empirical data regarding out-of-state citations when courts apply 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and its mandatory uniformity provision. Part 
III addresses the limitations that the separation of powers doctrine places on 
the legislature’s ability to direct the judiciary in its choice of precedent. 
Finally, Part IV of this Article makes the normative case for adopting the test 
described in the preceding paragraph to fill the precedential gap. It details 
how the proffered test would be applied and how the test would lead to 
beneficial results. 
I. SOME NECESSARY BACKGROUND 
Some background is necessary to understand the precedential hole that 
needs plugging. This Part first overviews the traditional distinction between 
binding and non-binding authority. It then describes the Uniform Law 
Commission, the proliferation of uniform acts across state statutory law, and 
the various forms that uniformity provisions take within uniform acts. 
A. Binding and Non-Binding Authority 
A binding authority is one that must be followed by the court of 
decision, whereas a non-binding authority is one that the court of decision 
need not follow.6 Under the doctrine of stare decisis, a previous court opinion 
  
regulatory agencies. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
 5 See infra Part II.A. 
 6 See ALEXA Z. CHEW & KATIE ROSE GUEST PRYAL, THE COMPLETE LEGAL WRITER 430, 440 
(2016); Fredrick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1940 (2008); see also 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 151-53 (2008). 
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is generally binding on a court’s ruling if it is published and issued by a court 
to which the ruling could be appealed.7 For example, a federal district court 
is bound by decisions of the federal court of appeals for the circuit within 
which the district is located.8 It is not bound by decisions of the other 
geographic federal courts of appeals, even though those courts are “higher” 
courts.9 An appellate court is usually bound by its own previous decisions, 
but trial courts generally are not.10 Even if an opinion is binding, however, 
dicta are non-binding.11 
A non-binding authority is anything that the court of decision does not 
have to follow.12 The idea is broad enough to include a grocery list or, indeed, 
this Article. In the realm of judicial opinions, however, a non-binding 
precedent is generally an opinion that was not designated for publication or 
was issued by a lower court or a court from another jurisdiction.13 The 
persuasive value of these non-binding precedents depends upon a number of 
factors, including the timeliness of the opinion, the reputation of the 
authoring judge, the level of the issuing court, and the geographic proximity 
of the issuing court to the court of decision.14 In short, a court may choose to 
follow a non-binding authority if it finds the authority’s reasoning 
persuasive, but a court must follow a binding authority simply based on the 
source’s authoritativeness.15 
  
 7 CHEW & PRYAL, supra note 6, at 60-61, 64-65; Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The 
World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 915-16 (2011). 
 8 MARY BETH BEAZLEY & MONTE SMITH, LEGAL WRITING FOR LEGAL READERS 57-58 (2014). 
 9 Id. One caveat in the federal system is that all district courts are bound by decisions of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with regard to issues that fall within the compass of the Federal 
Circuit’s subject matter jurisdiction. A district court’s decision on an issue within the Federal Circuit’s 
subject matter jurisdiction will be reviewed on appeal by the Federal Circuit rather than the court of 
appeals for the circuit in which the district court is geographically located. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2012) 
(setting forth the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction); South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 
(Fed. Cir. 1982) (adopting the decisions of its predecessor courts, the Court of Claims and the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals, as binding precedent). 
 10 CHEW & PRYAL, supra note 6, at 64-65. Even when a court is bound by its own prior decisions, 
it often possesses the power to overrule itself. See id. at 441; BEAZLEY & SMITH, supra note 8, at 43. 
 11 CHEW & PRYAL, supra note 6, at 61, 79. 
 12 Id. at 440; Schauer, supra note 6, at 1940. 
 13 See CHEW & PRYAL, supra note 6, at 60-61, 64-65. 
 14 Id. at 61-67; Kevin Bennardo, Testing the Geographical Proximity Hypothesis: An Empirical 
Study of Citations to Nonbinding Precedent by Indiana Appellate Courts, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
ONLINE 125, 126 (2015); see also Margolis, supra note 7, at 916 (“[T]he strength of persuasive authority 
depends on the reader’s perception of its value.”). 
 15 See Schauer, supra note 6, at 1940-45; see also Margolis, supra note 7, at 914 (“Sources are 
considered ‘authority’ because of where they come from as much as for what they say.”).  
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B. Uniform Acts 
1. The Uniform Law Commission and Its Drafting Process 
Uniform acts play a significant role in state statutory law.16 Uniform acts 
are drafted by the Uniform Law Commission, formerly known as the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws.17 The 
Commission was formed in 1892 to “provide[] states with non-partisan, well-
conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to 
critical areas of the law.”18 
As a state governmental organization, the Commission is funded 
primarily by state governments, with expenses apportioned among the 
states.19 Each state determines how many commissioners to appoint, the 
method of appointment, and the term of appointment.20 The only 
organizational-level requirement is that all commissioners must be members 
of the bar.21 Commissioners are not compensated for their work on the 
Commission.22 
The Commission solicits proposals for new drafting projects, and refers 
proposals to its internal committees for consideration.23 If a project is 
approved for drafting, a drafting committee is appointed.24 The 
commissioners selected for the drafting committee may or may not have 
subject-matter expertise in that particular area of law.25 A reporter is also 
appointed for each drafting project.26 The reporter is usually a non-
commissioner with considerable subject-matter expertise, such as a law 
  
 16 See Thomas P. Gallanis, Trusts and Estates: Teaching Uniform Law, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 
673 (2014) (“The [Uniform Law Commission] is active in all fields of state law.”). Professor Gallanis’ 
article provides an excellent general overview of the Commission and its drafting process. See id. at 672-
73, 676-78. 
 17 See ULC, OBSERVER’S MANUAL 1 (2013) [hereinafter ULC OBSERVER’S MANUAL]. 
 18 Id. 
 19 See id. at 2; see also Frequently Asked Questions, ULC, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Frequently Asked Questions (last visited Nov. 17, 
2017) [hereinafter ULC, Frequently Asked Questions]. Here, the term “state” includes the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. ULC OBSERVER’S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 20 See ULC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 19. A typical term is three or four years. ULC 
OBSERVER’S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 21 See ULC OBSERVER’S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 22 Id. Commissioners are reimbursed for the expenses incurred in attending meetings. Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. 
 25 See Gallanis, supra note 16, at 677. 
 26 See ULC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 19. For the ruminations of one reporter, see 
Joan Heifetz Hollinger, The Uniform Adoption Act: Reporter’s Ruminations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 345 (1996). 
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professor in the field.27 The Commission also invites the American Bar 
Association to appoint an advisor to each drafting committee, and other 
interested groups are invited to send representatives to observe or advise.28 
Because each uniform act must be read aloud at least twice at the 
Commission’s annual meeting, the drafting process spans multiple years.29 
The drafting committee meets throughout the drafting process and invites 
input from outside interested parties and experts.30 When a draft act is 
presented for final approval, each state has one vote regardless of its number 
of commissioners.31 A draft act is approved if it receives affirmative votes 
from a majority of the states represented at the annual meeting (and a 
minimum of at least twenty votes).32 Once a draft act is approved, it becomes 
a uniform act that is sent to state legislatures for consideration.33 At that point, 
the commissioners advocate to enact the uniform act in their home 
jurisdictions.34 Of course, state legislatures are free to enact or not enact a 
uniform act, to borrow portions of a uniform act, or to modify its language.35 
The Commission may also update uniform acts with amendments.36  
2. The Abundancy of Uniform Acts and Uniformity Provisions 
Uniform acts are widespread, both in terms of subject matter and 
enactments. According to the Commission’s most recent public data, its one 
hundred uniform acts have garnered 2,111 enactments in fifty-three 
jurisdictions.37 These acts relate to subjects as varied as business 
organizations and regulations; civil procedure and the courts; commerce and 
finance; consumer protection and labor; criminal law and procedure; family 
law; international law; medical and public health law; probate, trusts, and 
  
 27 ULC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 19; see also Types of Committees, ULC 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Types of Committees (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 28 See ULC OBSERVER’S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2-4. For example, representatives of the 
National Council for Adoption, the American Academy of Adoption Attorneys, and the American 
Adoption Congress served as additional advisors to the Uniform Adoption Act’s drafting committee. 
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT (ULC 1994), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/adoption/uaa_final_94.pdf. 
 29 See ULC OBSERVER’S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 30 See ULC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 19. 
 31 See ULC OBSERVER’S MANUAL, supra note 17, at 2. 
 32 Id. at 2-3. 
 33 See ULC, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 19. 
 34 See ULC, About the ULC, ULC http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About the 
ULC (last visited Nov. 19, 2017). 
 35 See Gallanis, supra note 16, at 678. 
 36 Id. at 679-80. 
 37 See ULC, 2015-2016 GUIDE TO UNIFORM AND MODEL ACTS 6-29 (2015), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Publications/GUMA_2015web.pdf (surveying enactments in fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) [hereinafter ULC, 2015-2016 
GUIDE]. The ULC also reports eighty-two enactments of its twenty-eight model acts. Id. 
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estates; real property; mortgages and liens; tax and miscellaneous; and tort 
and alternative dispute resolution.38 
The drafting rules governing uniform acts ensure that uniform acts 
follow a uniform structure.39 Under the current drafting rules, a uniform act 
may not include a statement of the purpose of the act in the text.40 In addition, 
each uniform act should contain a section, entitled “uniformity of application 
and construction,” that reads: “In applying and construing the uniform act, 
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law 
with respect to its subject matter among states enacting it.”41 This language 
requires courts to consider uniformity with other enacting jurisdictions when 
interpreting a state’s enactment of a uniform law, but does not require 
uniform construction. Under this provision, an out-of-state interpretation of 
the same statutory language would squarely be non-binding precedent, 
although a deciding court would at a minimum have to “consider” it. 
About half of uniform acts contain an older version of the uniformity 
clause. Although language differs among some acts, the older version of the 
uniformity clause mandates that the “Act shall be applied and construed to 
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the 
subject matter of this Act among the States enacting it.”42 This “mandatory 
  
 38 Id. at 30-33. Uniform acts play a meaningful role in many sectors of state statutory law. Examples 
range from the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act to the Uniform Military and Overseas 
Voters Act to the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act to the Uniform Manufactured 
Housing Act to the Uniform Estate Tax Apportionment Act. 
 39 See ULC, DRAFTING RULES (2012), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Publications/DraftingRules_2012.pdf. 
 40 See id. at 38 (Rule 501). 
 41 Id. at 40 (Rule 601); see, e.g., UNIF. CHILD ABDUCTION PREVENTION ACT § 11 (ULC 2006); 
UNIF. MANUFACTURED HOUS. ACT § 12 (ULC 2012). 
 42 The following uniform acts contain a mandatory uniformity provision: UNIF. COMMON INTEREST 
OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-110 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 2014); UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT 
§ 13 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 2014); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-102 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 
2010); UNIF. COMPUT. INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 106(A)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 2002); 
U.C.C. § 1-103(A)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 
6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999); UNIF. MULTIPLE-PERS. ACCOUNTS ACT § 32 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
AMENDED 1998); UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995); 
UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 706 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 1995); UNIF. STATUTE AND 
RULE CONSTR. ACT § 24 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995); UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 29 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1995); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 8-101 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994); UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 
12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994); UNIF. CORR. OR CLARIFICATION OF DEFAMATION ACT § 11 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 1993); UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 15 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993); UNIF. 
SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1993); UNIF. VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT § 501 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1992); UNIF. TESTAMENTARY ADDITIONS TO TRS. ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1991); 
UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 301 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1991); UNIF. MARKETABLE TITLE ACT § 12 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1990); UNIF. PERIODIC PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS ACT § 20 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1990); UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1986, 1990); UNIF. 
FOREIGN MONEY CLAIMS ACT § 14 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989); UNIF. TOD SEC. REGISTRATION ACT § 
11(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989, 1998); UNIF. CONSTR. LIEN ACT § 101(A)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
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uniformity provision” contains much stronger language than the modern 
version described in the preceding paragraph. The older version names 
uniformity as the overarching purpose of the act and requires courts to 
interpret the act’s language in the way that best achieves the goal of 
uniformity. In other words, uniformity is mandatory under the language of 
the old provision. 
Some jurisdictions have legislated generally applicable canons of 
statutory construction that mandate uniformity in the interpretation of all 
uniform acts. For example, in Pennsylvania, all “[s]tatutes uniform with 
those of other states shall be interpreted and construed to effect their general 
purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.”43 
Similarly, in Wyoming, “[a]ny uniform act shall be interpreted and construed 
to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states 
which enact it.”44 These clauses direct the judiciary to prioritize uniformity 
in interpreting every statute based on a uniform act. 
II. THE EFFECT OF MANDATORY UNIFORMITY CLAUSES ON JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION 
It is natural to expect state courts to consider out-of-state case law when 
interpreting a uniform act. When a state court interprets a uniform act that 
contains a mandatory uniformity provision, however, the out-of-state case 
  
1987); UNIF. CUSTODIAL TR. ACT § 20 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1987); UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL 
INTERESTS ACT § 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1986); UNIF. CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORDS ACT § 14 (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1986); UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 23 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 1986); 
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 1985); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER 
ACT § 11 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984); UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 21 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983); 
UNIF. FED. LIEN REGISTRATION ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1978, 1982); UNIF. CONSERVATION 
EASEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1981); UNIF. CONDO. ACT § 1-110 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980); 
UNIF. DETERMINATION OF DEATH ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980); UNIF. INFO. PRACTICES CODE § 
1-102 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1980); UNIF. AUDIO-VISUAL DEPOSITION ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1978); UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE 
§ 1.102(2)(G) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1974); MODEL EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1603 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
1974); UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 103 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N, AMENDED 1974); UNIF. 
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.102(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1972); UNIF. DUTIES TO 
PERS. WITH MED. ID DEVICES ACT § 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1972); UNIF. ALCOHOLISM AND 
INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT § 36 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1971); UNIF. DISPOSITION OF CMTY. PROP. 
AT DEATH ACT § 10 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1971); UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT § 1(5) (UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1970); UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964); 
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 8 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962); UNIF. FACSIMILE 
SIGNATURES OF PUB. OFFICIALS ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1958); UNIF. DIVISION OF INCOME FOR 
TAX PURPOSES ACT § 19 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1957); UNIF. ACT TO SECURE THE ATTENDANCE OF 
WITNESSES FROM WITHOUT A STATE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1936); UNIF. 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 15 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1922). 
 43 1 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 1927 (1972). 
 44 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-103(a)(vii) (2008). 
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law takes on a different character. This Part will describe case law and 
empirical data regarding the effect of mandatory uniformity clauses on out-
of-state precedent. 
A. Mandatory Uniformity Clauses in Case Law 
Modern courts have failed to converge on a clear or cohesive treatment 
of mandatory uniformity clauses in uniform acts. However, as chronicled 
below, older decisions are more likely to construe the language of a 
mandatory uniformity clause as requiring something closer to its literal 
meaning. In a 1916 interpretation of the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, 
the U.S. Supreme Court noted that, if uniform acts are permitted to be 
construed according to the local views of each state, “we shall miss the 
desired uniformity and we shall erect upon the foundation of uniform 
language separate legal structures as distinct as were the former varying 
laws.”45 In 1923, the Supreme Court of Utah found that the mandatory 
uniformity provision of the Uniform Sales Act rendered it a “duty of this 
court” to follow constructions by “the court of last resort of any state in which 
the Uniform Sales Act is in force.”46 In the words of the court, “[i]t would be 
utterly futile for the Legislatures of the several states to adopt uniform laws 
upon any subject if each court of the several states followed the notion of its 
members with regard to how a particular provision should be construed and 
applied.”47 In 1930, the Supreme Court of Nebraska interpreted the same 
provision as an “express mandate” from the legislature to construe the statute 
“in harmony with the previous decisions rendered by the courts of our sister 
states prior to its adoption here.”48 The Nebraska approach marks the 
beginning of a shift away from strict uniformity in statutory interpretation 
because it only requires adherence to out-of-state authority that was present 
at the time the state legislature adopted the uniform act. 
The Vermont Supreme Court spoke more equivocally in its 1937 
description of the mandatory uniformity provision of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgment Act: “[u]nder the . . . provision, decisions of the 
highest courts of other states are, speaking generally, precedents by which 
we are more or less imperatively bound in cases where similar questions are 
presented.”49 Language in this vein, which identifies the mandatory 
uniformity provision but does not identify the precise weight of out-of-state 
opinions, is typical of modern opinions. For example, the Indiana Supreme 
Court has stated: 
  
 45 Commercial Nat’l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-La. Bank & Tr. Co., 239 U.S. 520, 528 (1916). 
 46 Stewart v. Hansen, 218 P. 959, 960 (Utah 1923). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Int’l Milling Co. v. N. Platte Flour Mills, Inc., 229 N.W. 22, 24 (Neb. 1930). 
 49 Town of Manchester v. Town of Townshend, 192 A. 22, 23 (N.H. 1937). 
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It is . . . apparent that Indiana legislators, adopting the [Uniform Trade Secret Act], sought the 
uniform application of UTSA definitions of trade secret consistent with the application of the 
act in other adopting jurisdictions. Therefore, case law from other UTSA jurisdictions becomes 
relevant authority for construction of trade secret law in Indiana.50 
The court went on to cite to numerous out-of-state opinions in its effort 
to construe and apply the definition of a trade secret.51 Unfortunately, the 
court failed to elaborate on the precedential weight of that outside “relevant 
authority.” Other Indiana courts have likewise referenced out-of-state 
opinions as “relevant” without further explaining the weight of that 
relevance.52 Numerous other state courts have recognized the special 
precedential situation created by mandatory uniformity clauses but have 
stopped short of articulating a useful standard for assessing the weight of out-
of-state opinions.53 
One lower court’s attempt to take a stand against following out-of-state 
interpretations merely to maintain consistency in construction was rejected 
from above. In construing a provision of the Uniform Arbitration Act, the 
intermediate appellate court of Maryland parted ways with the majority of 
out-of-state interpretations, stating that it “decline[d] to move like lemmings 
toward the precipice of erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute 
by summarily subscribing to uniformity for uniformity’s sake, when other 
  
 50 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 917-18 (Ind. 1993) (emphasis added). 
 51 Id. at 918-21. 
 52 See, e.g., HDNET, LLC v. N. Am. Boxing Council, 972 N.E.2d 920, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); 
N. Elec. Co. v. Torma, 819 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
 53 Like Indiana, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has held that a mandatory uniformity 
provision makes out-of-state interpretations “relevant.” In re Ball, 123 A.3d 719, 722 (N.H. 2015) 
(construing the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act). The Supreme Court of Vermont has stated that it 
“draw[s] from the decisions of our sister states.” Dicks v. Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Vt. 2001) 
(construing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act). The Supreme Court of Minnesota gives “great weight to 
other states’ interpretations of a uniform law.” Citizens State Bank Norwood Young Am. v. Brown, 849 
N.W.2d 55, 61 (Minn. 2014) (quoting Johnson v. Murray, 648 N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn. 2002)). Minnesota 
has a statute directing that all “[l]aws uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted and construed 
to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact them.” MINN. STAT. 
§ 645.22 (2017). The Supreme Court of North Dakota looks to other state courts’ interpretations of 
uniform acts “for interpretive guidance,” Rydberg v. Johnson, 583 N.W.2d 631, 633 (N.D. 1998) 
(construing the Uniform Parentage Act), and considers those interpretations “highly persuasive.” Milbrath 
v. Milbrath, 508 N.W.2d 360, 363 (N.D. 1993) (construing the Uniform Probate Code). The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota finds analysis from other courts to be “persuasive” despite noting that uniform 
interpretation is “statutorily mandated” by the mandatory uniformity provision. In re Estate of Geier, 809 
N.W.2d 355, 359 (S.D. 2012) (construing the Uniform Probate Code). Given a mandatory uniformity 
provision in a District of Columbia statute, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia stated that 
“it is appropriate to consider how the courts in [other] states have interpreted their states’” enactment of 
the same uniform act. Catalyst & Chem. Servs., Inc. v. Glob. Ground Support, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 n.3 
(D.D.C. 2004) (construing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act). 
 
2017] THE THIRD PRECEDENT 157 
sound principles of statutory construction mandate a different result.”54 The 
state’s high court reversed, finding the term at issue ambiguous, and followed 
the interpretation of the majority of out-of-state jurisdictions.55 
In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has been criticized for its lack 
of concern for uniformity in interpreting the state’s enactment of the Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). The court has twice focused its attention on the 
mandatory uniformity provision of its state’s enactment of the UTSA.56 The 
weight it afforded to prior out-of-state case law seemed to shift depending on 
whether the court agreed with the out-of-state interpretations. In a 2002 
opinion, the court noted the act’s mandatory uniformity provision and 
dubbed a prior New Hampshire opinion with which it agreed “highly 
persuasive.”57 However, only four years later, the same court faced a situation 
in which it disagreed with the majority approach to the interpretation of a 
different provision of the same uniform act.58 This time, the court did not note 
the high persuasive value of out-of-state interpretations, but rather said that 
other adopting states’ “interpretations of similar statutes may serve as useful 
extrinsic sources to assist in statutory construction, if required.”59 The court 
found that it was unnecessary to consult such “extrinsic sources,” however, 
because the meaning of the statute was plain60 and “cases from other 
jurisdictions cannot substitute for [the court’s own] construction of the 
relevant Wisconsin Statute.”61 The majority’s disregard for the mandatory 
uniformity provision has been criticized by a sharply written dissent,62 by 
other courts,63 and by commentators.64 
The decisions described above mindfully determined how to interpret 
statutes in the face of a mandatory uniformity provision. In other cases, courts 
simply neglect to mention the clause. These courts either do not recognize 
  
 54 Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 694 A.2d 107, 120 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997), 
rev’d, 720 A.2d 912 (Md. 1998). 
 55 Blitz v. Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 720 A.2d 912, 916-18 (Md. 1998). 
 56 See Burbank Grease Servs. LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781, 785 (Wisc. 2006); World Wide 
Prosthetic Supply, Inc. v. Mikulsky, 640 N.W.2d 764 (Wisc. 2002). 
 57 World Wide Prosthetic Supply, Inc., 640 N.W.2d at 768. 
 58 See Burbank Grease Servs. LLC, 717 N.W.2d at 788-94. 
 59 Id. at 792 (emphasis added). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 793. 
 62 See id. at 799 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (“Why does the majority ignore the legislative directive 
that [the statute] be construed to further a uniform interpretation of UTSA among the states?”). 
 63 See, e.g., BlueEarth Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 235 P.3d 310, 320-21 (Haw. 2010); 
Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 664 (N.H. 2006). 
 64 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 195, 216 (2014) 
(“Courts cannot achieve the uniformity sought by the UTSA’s drafters if the protection of some 
commercial information remains subject to the vagaries of common law.”); Sarah Gettings, Note, Burbank 
Grease Services, LLC v. Sokolowski: Frustrating Uniformity in Trade Secrets Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 423, 440 (2007) (opining that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had “reverted trade secret law to its pre-
UTSA state, leaving trade secret protection state-specific, uneven, and uncertain”). 
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that the clause demands consideration of outside precedent when interpreting 
the statute or simply fail to communicate that recognition. Either way, the 
failure of an interpreting court to consider prior out-of-state interpretations 
when applying a state statute that contains a mandatory uniformity clause 
disregards the language of the statute. 
B. Empirical Data Regarding Uniformity under the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act 
The UTSA is a worthy subject to test the effect of a mandatory 
uniformity provision. The UTSA is one of the more successful uniform acts 
(if success is measured by adoptions). After nine years of drafting, the UTSA 
was finalized in 1979.65 Since then, it has been adopted in whole or in part in 
forty-seven states.66 It has, in many important respects, achieved a 
convergence of the statutory law governing trade secrets across the country. 
The UTSA mandates uniformity in its construction. It states: “[t]his 
[Act] shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] among states enacting 
it.”67 Numerous states have enacted this mandatory uniformity provision into 
law.68 
Previous empirical research has analyzed the frequency with which 
courts cite to out-of-state precedent in cases involving the UTSA. One study 
of trade secret litigation in the federal courts found that persuasive authority 
was cited in 27 percent of a sample of trade secret opinions from 1950-2007 
and in 26 percent of a sample of trade secret opinions from 2008.69 The 
study’s authors defined persuasive authority as “authority from a jurisdiction 
other than the jurisdiction whose law the court applied.”70 The authors found 
the high rate of citations to persuasive authority “surprising because each 
state has its own autonomous body of trade secret law and thus need not cite 
any other law.”71 The authors hypothesized that some courts may have looked 
to persuasive authority because the home jurisdiction lacked sufficient trade 
  
 65 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When 
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 513 (2010). The UTSA 
was then amended in 1985. Id. at 536. 
 66 See ULC, 2015-2016 GUIDE, supra note 38, at 38 (showing enactment of the UTSA in some form 
in all states except Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina). The UTSA has also been enacted by 
the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. 
 67 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (ULC 1985). 
 68 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.8 (West 2017); FLA. STAT. § 688.009 (2017); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 134A.008 (West 2017). 
 69 Davis S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 311 (2010). 
 70 Id. The substantive law of trade secrets “is almost always state law.” Id. at 306. 
 71 Id. at 311. 
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secret jurisprudence to sustain a self-contained universe of precedent.72 
Another potential explanation was that courts could cite to persuasive 
precedent “without much difficulty” if the trade secret law was sufficiently 
similar from state to state.73 A third potential reason for the seemingly high 
rate of citations to persuasive authority was the possibility that courts sought 
out the most factually analogous cases to cite, even if those cases came from 
another jurisdiction.74 Although the authors were unable to arrive at a 
conclusive reason based on their data, they advised that “the consequences 
are clear: litigants should research and cite the law nationwide, as courts may 
use that law in reaching their decisions.”75 
In a separate study of trade secret litigation in state courts, however, the 
same authors found a very different result: unlike their federal counterparts, 
state courts cite out-of-state authority relatively rarely in trade secret 
opinions.76 Only 7 percent of the trade secret opinions in the state court 
sample cited to out-of-state authority.77 Within that set of data, 16 percent of 
the opinions of a state’s highest court cited to out-of-state authority, while 6 
percent of the opinions of a state’s intermediate appellate court cited to out-
of-state authority.78 Just as the authors had been surprised by the high rate of 
citations to persuasive authority in trade secret litigation in the federal courts, 
they were likewise surprised by the low rate of citations to out-of-state 
authority in the state courts, particularly given the “dearth of [binding] 
precedent” in the area of trade secret law in many states.79 Despite the low 
rate of citations to non-binding in state courts, the authors recommended that 
advocates cite to out-of-state precedent given the goal of uniformity 
embedded in the UTSA.80 
A drawback to these previous studies is the lack of a control set. It is 
difficult to contextualize the significance of the above-stated citation rates 
without knowing how often federal and state courts cite to persuasive 
authority in non-trade secret litigation. In order to shed some light in this 
  
 72 See id. (noting that, from 2000-2009, Wyoming had one trade secret opinion, North Dakota had 
four, and Vermont had five). 
 73 Id. 
 74 See id. 
 75 Almeling et al., supra note 69, at 311. 
 76 See Davis S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 
GONZ. L. REV. 57, 77 (2011). Notably, the opinions in the state court study were appellate opinions, 
whereas the opinions in the federal court study were trial-level opinions. Id. at 59. The authors explained 
that state trial court opinions were often unpublished and not well suited to analysis. Id. 
 77 Id. at 77. The sample included 358 state court opinions from 1995-2009. Id. at 59. 
 78 Id. at 77. 
 79 Id. at 78. The authors found that only nineteen states had four or more published appellate 
opinions that met their definition of a “trade secret case” over the fourteen-year period studied. Id. at 77-
78. 
 80 See id. at 78. 
 
160 GEO. MASON L. REV. [VOL. 25:1 
regard, data from a previous citation study of Indiana appellate court 
decisions provides a useful baseline. 
An earlier study, prepared by the author, analyzed the citations in 1,324 
opinions from Indiana appellate courts from 2012 and 2013.81 These cases 
were drawn from all areas of the law, with the exception of attorney 
discipline matters. Of this opinion set, 687 opinions (51.9 percent) cited only 
to Indiana opinions.82 The balance of the opinions contained 738 distinct 
citations83 to judicial opinions from the other forty-nine states.84 The overall 
rate of citation was 0.56 out-of-state citations per opinion.85 The Indiana 
opinions also contained 1,789 citations to distinct federal opinions.86 Thus, 
each opinion contained an average of 1.91 citations to opinions that were not 
from an Indiana state court.87 This baseline citation rate can be compared to 
the citation rate from UTSA cases to ascertain whether Indiana courts look 
to out-of-state authority more often in UTSA cases. 
Indiana enacted the UTSA in 1982.88 Since then, Indiana appellate 
courts have cited Indiana’s enactment of the UTSA in forty-six opinions.89 
Out of those forty-six opinions, twenty cite only to Indiana state opinions. 
The remaining twenty-six opinions contain thirty-six distinct citations to 
judicial opinions of the other forty-nine states. The overall rate of citation 
was 0.73 out-of-state citations per opinion.90 The Indiana trade secret 
opinions also contained eighty-eight citations to distinct federal opinions.91 
Thus, each Indiana trade secret opinion had an average of 2.69 citations to 
opinions that were not from an Indiana state court.92 While not 
comprehensive, this data indicates that Indiana appellate courts are more 
likely to cite to a non-Indiana state court opinion when interpreting or 
applying Indiana’s enactment of the UTSA than in other cases in general. 
  
 81 Bennardo, supra note 14, at 126. 
 82 Id. at 133. 
 83 Each reference to a discrete opinion in each Indiana opinion was counted as one citation. See id. 
& n.52. 
 84 Id. at 133. 
 85 Calculated by dividing 738 out-of-state citations by 1324 opinions. 
 86 The federal citations broke down as follows: 1093 citations to U.S. Supreme Court opinions, 525 
citations to federal court of appeals opinions, and 171 citations to federal district court opinions.  
 87 Calculated by adding 738 out-of-state citations to 1789 federal citations and dividing the sum by 
1324 opinions. 
 88 See IND. CODE §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (2017); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Laird, 622 N.E.2d 912, 
917 (Ind. 1993). 
 89 The new data cited in this paragraph was compiled through Lexis Advance searches run on July 
15, 2015. 
 90 Calculated by dividing thirty-six out-of-state citations by forty-six opinions. 
 91 The federal citations broke down as follows: eight citations to U.S. Supreme Court opinions, 
thirty-four citations to federal court of appeals opinions, and forty-six citations to federal district court 
opinions. 
 92 Calculated by adding thirty-six out-of-state citations to eighty-eight federal citations and dividing 
the sum by forty-six opinions. 
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Given the mandatory uniformity provision in the statute,93 this result is 
unsurprising. 
III. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS A LIMIT ON A LEGISLATURE’S ABILITY TO 
DICTATE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Uniformity provisions raise separation-of-powers concerns. May a 
legislature dictate to the judiciary which authorities to consult when 
interpreting a statute? In a concurrence, Michigan Supreme Court Justice 
Stephen Markman noted his view regarding the legislature’s ability to dictate 
the judiciary’s method of statutory interpretation: 
[W]hen the Legislature purports to exercise its legislative power to dictate a rule of 
interpretation to this Court, as some might read [the applicable mandatory uniformity 
provision] as doing, the Legislature exceeds its authority and impinges on the judicial power, 
which is the power to interpret the law and say what that law means. It is this Court’s 
responsibility to exercise the judicial power and to give reasonable meaning to the law by 
examining its language, structure, organization, and purpose. I do not believe that the 
Legislature can impose any different rules of interpretation upon this Court. Although on 
occasions I have acquiesced in the application of legislative rules of interpretation, I am 
increasingly of the view that such rules are not only incapable of coherent application, but that 
they trespass upon the authority of the judiciary . . . . If it is the Legislature’s intent that the 
law be interpreted in a particular manner, the most reliable means of securing this result is for 
the Legislature to write the law in that manner.94 
Of course, every state’s constitution and separation of powers 
jurisprudence is distinct.95 What follows is an attempt to broadly capture the 
potential constitutional concerns attendant to the legislative directives 
contained in uniformity provisions. 
A. Jellum’s Separation of Powers Framework 
Separation of powers analyses are rarely models of clarity.96 As a helpful 
aid, Professor Linda Jellum constructed a useful framework under which to 
assess separation of powers concerns for directives in which the legislature 
commands the judiciary regarding statutory interpretation.97 This Part will 
  
 93 IND. CODE § 24-2-3-1(b) (2017) (“This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its 
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject matter of this chapter among states 
enacting the provisions of this chapter.”). 
 94 People v. Thompson, 730 N.W.2d 708, 715-16 (Mich. 2007) (Markman, J., concurring). 
 95 See, e.g., David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law: Separation of 
Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 655, 655-56 (2011). 
 96 See Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be Master,” the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory 
Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 837, 855 (2009). 
 97 See generally id. 
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summarize separation of powers analyses generally as well as under Jellum’s 
framework. 
Jellum identifies two approaches to separation of powers analyses: 
formalist and functionalist.98 The formalist approach “emphasizes the need to 
maintain three distinct branches of government based on function,” while the 
functionalist approach “emphasizes the need to maintain pragmatic 
flexibility to respond to modern government” and “posits that overlap beyond 
the core functions [of each branch] is practically necessary and even 
desirable.”99 Formalists simply identify the functions of each branch and find 
that the principle of separation of powers is violated if one branch exercises 
another branch’s core function.100 Functionalists, on the other hand, 
“minimize, but do not bar completely, encroachments into the core functions 
of each branch” by the other branches.101 Thus, under functionalism, the 
legislature and the judiciary are partners in the law-making and law-
interpreting processes. The judiciary may exercise some law-making power 
(through interpretation and the promulgation of the common law) and the 
legislature may exercise some interpretive power (through announcing policy 
objectives and other guidance in statutory interpretation).102 Under a strictly 
formalistic approach, the legislature makes the law, the judiciary interprets 
it, and the legislature rewrites the law after the fact if it is unhappy with the 
judiciary’s interpretation.103 Both doctrines coexist in American 
jurisprudence, and neither has emerged as the clear path.104 
Jellum identifies numerous characteristics of statutory directives. First, 
directives may be definitional, interpretive, or theoretical.105 Second, 
directives may be specific or general.106 Lastly, directives may be mandatory, 
presumptive, or permissive.107 
Definitional directives are statutory definitions of terms.108 These 
definitions may either be specific to a particular statute or apply generally to 
all statutes in a code.109 Interpretive directives tell judges how to interpret 
  
 98 See id. at 854-55. 
 99 Id. at 854-55, 860-61. 
 100 See id. at 861-62. 
 101 Id. at 870. 
 102 See Jellum, supra note 96, at 872. 
 103 Id. at 871-72. 
 104 Id. at 855, 878-79. 
 105 Id. at 847. 
 106 Id. Specific directives are specific to a particular statute while general directives apply to all 
statutes in a code. Id. 
 107 Id. Mandatory directives must be followed; presumptive directives create a presumption that 
courts may avoid under certain conditions; permissive directives need not be followed. Id. at 852-53. 
 108 See Jellum, supra note 96, at 847. 
 109 See id. at 847-48. For example, the Indiana Code has certain definitions that “apply to the 
construction of all Indiana statutes, unless the construction is plainly repugnant to the intent of the general 
assembly or of the context of the statute.” IND. CODE § 1-1-4-5 (2017). Specific acts within the Indiana 
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statutes, and again may either apply to a specific statute or generally to an 
entire code.110 For example, an interpretive directive might tell courts to 
interpret a statute narrowly or to prefer the ordinary meaning of words.111 
Theoretical directives “tell judges what process to use to interpret statutes,”112 
that is, which theoretical approach to apply in construing language.113 A key 
distinction among each theory of interpretation involves which sources may 
be consulted in the interpretive process.114 Thus, a hallmark of theoretical 
directives is a command to judges regarding “which . . . sources of meaning, 
or ‘evidence,’ they may consider when interpreting a statute.”115 
Under Jellum’s analysis, definitional directives do not violate separation 
of powers under either the formalistic or the functionalistic approach.116 
Definitional directives are legislative in nature because the law-making 
power includes the power to say what words and phrases are intended to 
mean.117 In short, “[d]efinitional directives are articulations of law rather than 
interpretations of law because definitional directives help ensure that the law 
and all of its contours are clearly understood by judges and litigants.”118 
Theoretical directives, on the other hand, violate the principle of 
separation of powers under both the formalistic and the functionalist 
approaches.119 A theoretical directive’s purpose is “to tell the judiciary what 
evidence to consider when interpreting statutes.”120 Such directives 
impermissibly encroach on the judiciary’s core function of interpreting the 
law. Intrusions by the legislature into the judicial realm are treated with more 
concern than other separation of powers issues.121 Commanding which 
sources are relevant to statutory interpretation is an attempt to control the 
judiciary and regulate its inner workings.122 It may also circumvent the 
executive’s veto power by permitting sources that were not the product of the 
legislative process to dictate statutory meaning.123 Consider legislation that 
directs that its meaning shall be dictated by some extrinsic source, such as a 
  
Code also list definitions limited to only those specific acts. E.g., IND. CODE § 24-2-3-2 (2017) (listing 
definitions for purposes of the Indiana Trade Secrets Act). 
 110 See Jellum, supra note 96, at 848. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 848-49. The three dominant theories of statutory interpretation are textualism, purposivism, 
and intentionalism. Id. at 849. 
 114 Id. at 849-50. 
 115 Id. at 851. 
 116 See Jellum, supra note 96, at 880-82. 
 117 Id. at 880-81. 
 118 Id. at 881. 
 119 Id. at 882-90. 
 120 Id. at 882. 
 121 Id. at 859 (noting that, at least in the federal scheme, the Framers were most troubled by intrusions 
by the legislature into the judicial sphere). 
 122 See Jellum, supra note 96, at 883-84. 
 123 Id. at 886-87. 
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particular dictionary or even a newspaper. Changes to the extrinsic source 
would alter statutory meaning without legislative action (including executive 
oversight through the veto power) and without any judicial input into 
interpretation. At a minimum, such a process robs the judiciary of its core 
interpretive function and therefore violates the separation of powers 
doctrine.124 
Interpretive directives are the most difficult to analyze. Jellum opines 
that interpretive directives likely violate the separation of powers doctrine 
under a strict formalistic approach, but not under a functionalistic 
approach.125 The formalistic analysis is relatively straightforward: 
interpretive directives are not legislative in nature, but rather direct the 
method of interpreting statutory language.126 Because statutory interpretation 
is the function of the judiciary, these directives violate the separation of 
powers doctrine under the formalistic approach.127 
Jellum finds that interpretive directives would likely be found 
constitutional under a functionalistic approach because these directives 
further the law-making and interpreting partnership between the legislature 
and the judiciary.128 Viewed through this lens, interpretive directives may be 
seen simply as the legislature’s legitimate clarification of its policy choices 
rather than a usurpation of judicial power.129 Such clarification is not 
problematic under the functionalist approach because functionalists 
recognize that the legislature possesses the authority to dictate policy even 
when it encroaches to some extent on the judiciary’s role of interpreting the 
law.130 
B. Applying Separation of Powers Doctrine to Mandatory Uniformity 
Provisions 
Under the above separation of powers framework, the central issue for 
uniformity provisions is whether such provisions are interpretive or 
theoretical directives. If they are theoretical directives, then they violate 
separation of powers. If they are interpretive, then the outcome depends on 
whether the formalistic or the functionalist approach is employed. 
Consider a mandatory uniformity provision that requires that the statute 
“shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject matter of this Act among the 
States enacting it.”131 On its face, such a provision is interpretive. It 
  
 124 Id. at 888-90. 
 125 Id. at 890. 
 126 Id. at 891. 
 127 Id. at 891-92. 
 128 See Jellum, supra note 96, at 892. 
 129 Id. at 893. 
 130 Id. at 893-94. 
 131 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (ULC 1985). 
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enumerates the legislative purpose behind the statute and directs the judiciary 
to apply the statute consistent with that purpose. However, depending on how 
such a provision operates in practice, it could be read as a theoretical directive 
that commands the court to follow the edicts of a particular extrinsic source 
(out-of-state judicial opinions). If such were the case, then a mandatory 
uniformity provision would almost certainly violate the separation of powers 
doctrine by usurping the judiciary’s interpretive function. 
Thus, in order to avoid a serious separation of powers problem, a 
mandatory uniformity provision should not be read to require a court to 
automatically follow the prior interpretations of another state’s judiciary. 
Such a requirement strips the home state’s judiciary of its core interpretive 
function altogether. To be constitutional, uniformity provisions should 
permit the home state’s judiciary to exercise at least some independent 
interpretive function. This important limitation should be recognized when 
applying mandatory uniformity provisions. 
IV. THE NORMATIVE PART: A TEST FOR APPLYING MANDATORY 
UNIFORMITY PROVISIONS 
Given that courts have failed to clearly converge on a unified treatment 
of mandatory uniformity provisions132 and the potential separation of powers 
concerns that surround taking the language of the mandatory uniformity 
provisions literally,133 this Part makes a normative proposal on the weight that 
should be afforded to out-of-state precedents when interpreting a statute that 
contains a mandatory uniformity provision. The following framework is 
designed to accommodate the statute’s stated goal of uniformity with the 
flexibility necessary to permit the judiciary to properly fulfill its interpretive 
duties. 
In short, out-of-state case law in this situation should not be regarded as 
traditionally binding nor non-binding precedent. This distinction has 
traditionally been governed by the relationship between the court of decision 
and the court that rendered the prior opinion.134 Such a relationship-based test 
does not adequately address the situation created by mandatory uniformity 
provisions. 
When coupled with a mandatory uniformity provision, out-of-state case 
law should occupy a special precedential posture, one that this author calls 
“interstitial authority.”135 The following Part develops a two-step test for 
  
 132 See supra Part II.A. 
 133 See supra Part III.B. 
 134 See supra Part I.A. 
 135 An interstice is an intervening space, especially a very small one. Interstitial authority fills the 
small gap between binding and non-binding precedent. Credit to Alexa Chew for suggesting the 
nomenclature. 
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courts to use when applying this category of precedent. The proposed test is 
modeled after the Chevron deference standard that guides courts in 
determining how much weight to afford prior statutory interpretations by 
regulatory agencies.136 Under the proposed test, an interpreting court should 
first determine whether the statutory language is clear. If it is clear, then the 
court should apply the statute’s clear meaning. If the statute is ambiguous, 
then the court should adopt the same interpretation as the out-of-state court 
as long as the out-of-state court’s interpretation is a permissible construction 
of the statute. If the prior interpretation is not a permissible one, however, the 
court should not be required to adopt it. This approach comports with the 
statutory requirement that the law be interpreted to further the purpose of 
national uniformity, but it provides enough leeway to avoid separation of 
powers concerns and to ensure that manifestly incorrect interpretations will 
not be mechanically perpetuated around the country. 
A. Step One: Inspecting for Ambiguity 
Under the first step, an interpreting court should determine whether the 
legislature’s intent is clear. If so, the court should simply apply the statutory 
language according to the clear will of the legislature. Even a mandatory 
uniformity provision should not bind a court to follow another jurisdiction’s 
interpretation if it runs counter to the clearly-expressed statutory text. As 
explained above, binding a home judiciary to an outside judiciary’s 
interpretation regardless of the propriety of the outside judiciary’s 
interpretation would almost certainly run afoul of the separation of powers 
doctrine.137 
Moreover, binding all later courts to a patently erroneous interpretation 
is a dangerous policy that carries the potential to ultimately undermine the 
Uniform Law Commission’s goal for uniformity on a broader scale. If the 
first court’s interpretation always sets binding precedent for all other 
jurisdictions, then the first court better do an exemplary job. Not only would 
the first court set precedent for its home state, but it would also set the 
  
 136 For comparison’s sake, the Chevron deference standard states: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is 
confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issues. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the 
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, 
as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issues, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute. 
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
 137 See supra Part III.B. 
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precedent for all other states that enacted the same uniform act with a 
mandatory uniformity provision. Other jurisdictions’ judiciaries would have 
no way to “overrule” the first court’s interpretation, no matter how irregular 
or erroneous it was. It is easy to imagine a manifestly erroneous interpretation 
permeating across the country under an overly strict approach to mandatory 
uniformity provisions. Such a result would give legislatures pause when 
considering future uniform acts—or at least acts containing mandatory 
uniformity provisions138—because some faraway state judiciary may exercise 
ultimate control over the act’s interpretation. Indeed, state legislatures may 
enact fewer uniform acts as a result, which would ultimately undermine the 
overall goal of national uniformity in certain areas of state law. 
The heart of step one of the analysis involves inspecting the clarity of 
legislative intent.139 While many state statutes have scant recorded legislative 
history, each uniform act comes pre-packaged with helpful interpretive 
commentary by the drafter.140 In this case, the statutory ‘drafter’ refers not to 
the state legislature, but to the Uniform Law Commission. Although this 
commentary is rarely enacted by a state legislature or accessible anywhere in 
the enacted code, courts have nonetheless found it a helpful and appropriate 
source to discern legislative intent.141 And, because the commentary is drafted 
contemporaneously with the uniform act by the same body, it is exceedingly 
strong evidence of what the statutory text was intended to mean.142 To ignore 
it would be folly. Thus, courts should look beyond the four corners of the 
statutory text—and specifically should focus on the uniform act’s 
commentary—when analyzing whether the legislative intent is clear.143 
One nuance to this first step ambiguity analysis arises under the 
borrowed statute rule. Under this rule, “when a legislature adopts a statute 
  
 138 Recall though that some states have generally applicable mandatory uniformity provisions that 
govern the interpretation of all uniform acts. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
 139 There are generally two approaches to this task: the textualist approach, which looks only to the 
statutory text, and the intentionalist approach, which looks to other indications of legislative intent. See 
RUTH ANN WATRY, ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE AFTERMATH OF CHEVRON V. 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL 8-9 (2002); see also FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 110-12 (2009); ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 
27-28 (2014); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 323-
25 (2000). As explained in the text, this Article favors following the intentionalist approach when 
interpreting state statutes based on uniform acts. 
 140 See Gallanis, supra note 16, at 679 (explaining that uniform act commentary is written by the 
uniform act’s reporter and approved by the chair of the drafting committee). 
 141 See, e.g., Basileh v. Alghusain, 912 N.E.2d 814, 821 (Ind. 2009) (stating that a uniform act’s 
commentary is “a strong indicator of the legislative intent when [the state legislature] enacted” it into 
law); Havens v. Portfolio Inv. Exch. Inc., 983 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011 (N.D. Ind. 2013); Kevin Bennardo, 
Special Considerations When Interpreting Uniform Acts, RES GESTAE, Jan./Feb. 2015, at 28. 
 142 Indeed, under the borrowed statute rule, explained infra, there is a strong argument that a state 
legislature that enacts a uniform act implicitly accepts the commentary that goes with it.  
 143 To be clear, a textualist approach would be workable if a jurisdiction decided to adopt it. The 
intentionalist approach is not imperative to the functioning of the overall two-step framework. 
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from a foreign jurisdiction, it implicitly incorporates the settled 
interpretations of the foreign statute’s judiciary.”144 Like any statutory 
adoption, a uniform act should carry with it the previous settled 
interpretations of the statutory language. The focus here, however, must be 
on whether previous interpretations were truly “settled.” Enacting a foreign 
jurisdiction’s statute does not incorporate prior judicial interpretations unless 
they were “known and settled.”145 Where a provision of a uniform act has 
been consistently interpreted by the high courts of multiple other 
jurisdictions, the jurisprudence should be regarded as settled.146 Thus, the pre-
existing interpretation should govern the statutory language even if it runs 
counter to the unambiguous meaning of the text. 
However, when another jurisdiction’s interpretation does not occur until 
after the act’s enactment in the home jurisdiction, the borrowed statute rule 
has no application. The home judiciary’s first task should be to determine 
whether the statutory meaning is unambiguous. If so, the home judiciary 
should simply follow the clear meaning of the statute. In essence, the home 
judiciary should disregard a mandatory uniformity provision if it finds that 
the text is unambiguous. Doing otherwise would permit the legislature to 
overreach into the judiciary’s core interpretive function. 
B. Step Two (*if necessary): Turning to Interstitial Authority in Cases of 
Ambiguity 
When statutory language is unclear, a mandatory uniformity provision 
should play a much greater role in the construction of the statute. After all, 
the legislature that chose to enact the mandatory uniformity provision 
deemed uniformity to be the paramount purpose of the statute and has 
commanded the judiciary to construe the statute to effectuate that goal. This 
statement of legislative intent should carry weight. 
Upon deeming statutory language ambiguous under first step analysis 
described above, a construing court should look to the jurisprudence of the 
high courts of other enacting jurisdictions. If another jurisdiction’s high court 
has already construed the statutory language, then that precedent should be 
given the weight of interstitial authority. Interstitial authority should be 
followed if it is a permissible construction of the statute. If there are no 
permissible interpretations from the high courts of other enacting 
jurisdictions, then the court’s interpretive task is not burdened by mandatory 
  
 144 Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 351 
(2010); see also ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 139, at 283-85. 
 145 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 36 (1899). 
 146 But see Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 310 (1957) (holding that the Court should not 
assume that Congress was aware of prior interpretations by lower state courts in the absence of legislative 
history indicating otherwise). 
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precedent. In that case, the construing court should simply engage in its usual 
course of statutory interpretation as a matter of first impression, including 
giving appropriate weight to any non-binding authority.147 
1. Restricting Interstitial Authority to Courts of Last Resort 
The interstitial authority designation should be reserved for decisions of 
courts of last resort. Lower courts’ opinions should be regarded as non-
binding precedent because they are generally afforded less respect than 
decisions of courts of last resort and are susceptible to being overruled.148 
Decisions of higher courts are generally more respected than those of 
lower courts.149 The system of precedent depends greatly on the respect 
afforded across its various levels. Because higher courts garner more respect 
than subordinate courts, a later out-of-state court will likely be more 
comfortable granting deference to another court’s decision when the other 
court is at least on the same level. A court of last resort understandably may 
have difficulty adopting the decision of another state’s intermediate appellate 
court as interstitial authority. Courts of last resort generally rely on a 
numerically greater number of decision-makers (justices) than the three-
judge panels that are common in intermediate appellate courts.150 Asking a 
high court to subordinate itself to the prior opinion of a lower court in another 
state conflicts so sharply with traditional notions of stare decisis that it seems 
imprudent to suggest it as a potentially viable system of precedent. 
Secondly, when considering whether to include an intermediate 
appellate court decision in the category of interstitial precedent, the 
possibility of the decision being overruled in the future poses a significant 
problem. Consider a situation in which an intermediate appellate court has 
the first opportunity to interpret a uniform act (this jurisdiction is the ‘original 
jurisdiction’).151 If that interpretation was treated as interstitial authority, then 
  
 147 Here, non-binding authority might take the form of a previous interpretation by a lower court in 
another enacting jurisdiction. 
 148 For example, when applying state law, a federal court must follow decisions of the state’s highest 
court, but not of the state’s lower courts. See BEAZLEY & SMITH, supra note 8, at 58-59. 
 149 See CHEW & PRYAL, supra note 6, at 61, 64-65 (identifying “the level of the court that decides 
the case” as relevant to authoritativeness); RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. & SHEILA SIMON, LEGAL WRITING 
51 (2011) (identifying the level of court as the third most important factor to a non-binding opinion’s 
persuasiveness); HELENE S. SHAPO, MARILYN R. WALTER & ELIZABETH FAJANS, WRITING AND 
ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 21 (6th ed. 2013) (“The level of the court that decided the previous case is 
important.”); see also BEAZLEY & SMITH, supra note 8, at 61-62 (identifying “the identity of the source 
of the authority” as relevant to persuasiveness). 
 150 All state courts of last resort have between five and nine justices. See State Court Organization, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.ncsc.org/sco (select Interactive State Court 
Organization App; select Table 2.2a (Number of Appellate Court Judges); select Court of Last Resort 
filter). 
 151 Indeed, such would almost always be the case because almost all states have intermediate 
appellate courts and the task of statutory interpretation begins in the lower courts. 
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other jurisdictions—including other jurisdictions’ highest courts—would 
follow that interpretation unless it was impermissible. If the same interpretive 
issue was later appealed to the highest court of the original jurisdiction in a 
different case, what weight would the intermediate appellate court’s prior 
interpretation hold? It is from a lower court from the same jurisdiction, so a 
mandatory uniformity provision would not force the higher court to follow 
it. But it has gained a following from other jurisdictions, which could 
arguably be interstitial precedent for the original jurisdiction’s highest court. 
If the original jurisdiction’s highest court overruled the intermediate 
appellate court’s original interpretation, what would that mean for all of the 
decisions that followed the intermediate appellate court’s interpretation as 
interstitial authority in the interim? Would its interpretation be effectively 
overruled? In short, there are too many difficult questions that lead to 
inherently arbitrary answers in this scenario. It is better to limit the 
designation of interstitial authority to precedents that are at least settled 
within the jurisdiction and are not subject to being revisited by a higher court. 
2. Identifying Permissible Constructions 
Under this proposal, interstitial precedent must be followed if it is a 
permissible construction of the statutory language. Thus, determining 
whether an interpretation is permissible or impermissible is a critical step in 
the analysis. In the administrative law context, “a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”152 In determining whether an 
agency’s interpretation is a permissible one, “[t]he court need not conclude 
that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have 
adopted to uphold construction, or even the reading the court would have 
reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”153 
This standard would work well in the context of assessing whether a 
court should be bound to follow interstitial precedent. If mandatory 
uniformity provisions carry any meaning, the later court should not approach 
the statute free from the baggage of the prior interpretation. It should not 
decline to follow a prior high court’s interpretation simply because it would 
have reached a different result as a matter of first impression. Rather, it 
should assess whether the prior interpretation is a reasonable one—that is, 
whether the interpretation is supported by the statute, even if other 
interpretations could also be supported by the statute. If the prior 
interpretation is a reasonable one, then the later court should be bound to 
  
 152 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 153 Id. at 843 n.11; see also AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388-92 (1999) (finding 
agency interpretation of statute to be unreasonable). 
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follow it in accordance with the mandatory uniformity provision.154 Such is 
the essence of interstitial authority. 
CONCLUSION: THE BENEFIT OF INTERSTITIAL AUTHORITY IN CONSTRUING 
UNIFORM ACTS 
Any consistent standard would be better than the current regime of 
unreliable application of mandatory uniformity provisions. Uniformity is the 
hallmark of uniform acts. The variable and often uncertain weight that courts 
have afforded to out-of-state interpretations of uniform acts has undermined 
the uniformity principle that is at the heart of such legislation—and is 
explicitly expressed by these statutes’ mandatory uniformity provisions. The 
entire endeavor of enacting uniform statutory language is jeopardized if 
courts lack guidance on what weight to give prior interpretations by other 
enacting jurisdictions. 
Of course, identifying the need for a standard does little to advance the 
claim that this Article’s proposed test should be adopted as the standard. This 
Article’s proposal strikes an important balance. Mandatory uniformity 
provisions should be afforded weight—even significant weight—but they 
cannot be both the starting and the ending point of statutory interpretation. 
These provisions should be a guiding light rather than a blinding one. 
Under this Article’s proposal, a mandatory uniformity provision would 
require a court to follow a previous interpretation of the highest court of 
another jurisdiction when the statutory language is ambiguous and the 
previous interpretation is a permissible one. When the statutory language is 
not ambiguous, a court should adhere to the plain meaning of the statute. 
When a previous interpretation is not a permissible construction of the 
statute, a later court should not be bound to follow it. 
Affording such great weight to a previous out-of-state interpretation 
furthers uniformity. This approach is consistent with the language of 
mandatory uniformity provisions, which state that the statutory language 
should be construed and applied “to effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among states enacting 
it.”155 Uniformity across jurisdictions is the general purpose of the statute. 
Thus, giving great weight to other jurisdictions’ interpretations is important. 
Uniform statutory language on the books means little if the words are not 
  
 154 The reason for deference is different in the present context than in the agency-regulatory context. 
Deference is granted to agencies’ gap-filling regulations because “[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap 
for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (discussing deference to express and 
implicit delegations of legislative authority). In the case of mandatory uniformity provisions, deference 
does not arise because of the legislature’s express delegation of authority to fill statutory gaps. Rather, a 
mandatory uniformity provision expressly adopts another jurisdiction’s reasonable construction of the 
same statutory language in the name of furthering the legislature’s overarching goal of uniformity. 
 155 See, e.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8 (ULC 1985). 
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uniformly interpreted to have the same meaning. Uniform law is not achieved 
unless both the statutory language and judicial construction of that language 
are consistent across enacting jurisdictions. 
But all must not be sacrificed at uniformity’s altar. There must be a 
limiting principle. Without any limiting principle, a single dreadful 
interpretation could permeate the country in the name of uniform 
construction. This result would deter legislatures from enacting uniform acts 
in the future, or at least those with mandatory uniformity provisions. The 
standard proposed by this Article safeguards the language of the statute by 
freeing courts from following manifestly incorrect interpretations. If a prior 
interpretation is unreasonable—either because the meaning of the statute is 
plain or because the interpretation cannot be reconciled with the statutory 
text—then a later court is not bound to follow it. This approach balances 
uniformity with flexibility in a way that gives meaning to the mandatory 
uniformity provision while still respecting the judiciary’s constitutional role 
as the interpreter of laws. 
 
